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1. Introduction  
The recent success of the Internet and the rapid development of information technology 
facilitate the proliferation of e-commerce, where all types of multimedia information can 
easily be stored, traded, replicated, and distributed in digital form without a loss of quality. 
As a main advantage over traditional commercial means, e-commerce brings convenience 
and efficiency for trading activities between sellers and buyers. However, it also enables 
illegal replications and distributions of digital products at a low cost. In this regard, there 
are many multimedia content providers still hesitating to sell and distribute their products 
over the Internet. Therefore, digital copyright protection is a main concern that needs to be 
addressed. On the other hand, how to protect the rights and provide security for both the 
seller and the buyer is another challenge for e-commerce. 
In the realm of security, encryption and digital watermarking are recognized as promising 
techniques for copyright protection. Encryption is to prevent unauthorized access to a digital 
content. The limitation is that once the content is decrypted, it doesn't prevent illegal 
replications by an authorized user. Digital watermarking (Cox et al., 2001, 1997), (Hartung & 
Kutter, 1999), complementing encryption techniques, provides provable copyright 
ownership by imperceptibly embedding the seller's information in the distributed content. 
Similarly, digital fingerprinting is to trace and identify copyright violators by embedding the 
buyer's information in the distributed content. 
The literature of fingerprinting research can be categorized as fingerprinting for generic 
data, e.g. c-secure fingerprinting code (Boneh & Shaw, 1995), fingerprinting for multimedia 
data (Wang et al., 2005), (Trappe et al., 2003), (Liu et al., 2005), and fingerprinting protocols, 
e.g. the ones based on secure two-party computations (Pittzmann & Schunter, 1996), 
(Pfitzmann & Waidner, 1997) or based on coin-based constructions (Pfitzmann & Sadeghi, 
1999, 2000), (Camenisch, 2000).The shortcoming of these fingerprinting schemes lies in the 
inefficiency of the implementations (Ju et al., 2002). On the other hand, the literature can also 
be categorized as symmetric schemes, asymmetric schemes, and anonymous schemes. In 
symmetric schemes (Blakley et al., 1986), (Boneh & Shaw, 1995), (Cox et al., 1997), both the 
seller and the buyer know the watermark and the watermarked content.  
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2. Non-framing: nobody can accuse an honest buyer. 
3. Non-repudiation: a guilty buyer cannot deny his responsibility for a copyright 
violation caused by him. 
4. Dispute resolution: the copyright violator should be identified and adjudicated 
without him revealing his private information, e.g. private keys or watermark. 
5. Conspiracy resistance: no colluded parties should be able to frame an innocent buyer 
or to confound the tracing by removing the watermark from the digital content. 
6. Anonymity: a buyer's identity is undisclosed until he is judged to be guilty. 
7. Unlinkability: nobody can determine whether the different watermarked contents are 
purchased by the same buyer or not. 
 
1.1 Analysis of the Existing Work 
The literature is rich of relevant buyer-seller watermarking protocols. Qiao and Nahrstedt 
(Qiao & Nahrstedt, 1998), first pointed out the customer's rights problem in the watermarking 
protocols for piracy tracing. However, their scheme is symmetric and doesn't guarantee the 
buyer's security. The first known asymmetric buyer-seller watermark protocol was 
introduced by Memon and Wong (Memon & Wong, 2001), and it was improved by Ju et al. 
(Ju et al., 2002). Since the first introduction of the concept, several alternative design solu-
tions have been proposed. Due to the space limit, instead of a full security analysis, we 
summarize the analysis and point out the shortcomings of each previous protocols (Choi et 
al., 2003), (Goi et al., 2004), (Lei et al., 2004), (Zhang et al., 2006), (Shao, 2007), and (Ibrahim 
et al., 2007). Except that the piracy tracing problem and the customer's rights problem are 
solved in the early schemes, the existing solutions to the other problems are either 
impractical or incomplete, as depicted in Table 1. Comparison of some existing buyer-seller 
watermarking protocols with our protocol 
1. The piracy tracing problem. All of these protocols are able to resolve the piracy tracing 
problem, and provide a mechanism for the seller to trace and recover the identity of a 
guilty buyer. 
2. The customer's rights problem. All these protocols can solve the customer's rights 
problem, since the protocols are designed asymmetric, i.e., the seller doesn't know the 
exact value of the buyer's watermark, neither does she know the final watermarked 
digital content that the buyer gets. Therefore, the accused buyer for a illegal replication 
or distribution cannot claim that the copy is originated from the seller or a security 
breach in the seller's system. 
3. The unbinding problem. Lei et al. (Lei et al., 2004) addressed the unbinding problem in 
(Memon & Wong, 2001), (Ju et al., 2002), (Choi et al., 2003), (Goi et al., 2004) and 
provided a mechanism to bind a specific transaction of a digital content to a specific 
buyer, such that a malicious seller cannot transplant the watermark embedded in a 
digital content to another higher-priced content. The similar design principle is applied 
in (Zhang et al., 2006) and (Shao, 2007). 
4. The conspiracy problem. Choi et al. (Choi et al., 2003) pointed out the conspiracy 
problem of (Memon & Wong, 2001), (Ju et al., 2002) where a malicious seller can collude 
with an untrustworthy third party to fabricate piracy to frame an innocent buyer. Goi et 
al. (Goi et al., 2004) found the conspiracy problem couldn't be solved through 
commutative cryptosystems of (Choi et al., 2003), and further point out that the 
schemes of (Memon & Wong, 2001), (Ju et al., 2002), (Choi et al., 2003) are vulnerable 
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Piracy tracing √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Customer's rights √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Unbinding     √ √ √ √ √ 
Conspiracy    √  √   √ 
Dispute resolution  √   √  √ √ √ 
Anonymity/unlink
ability 
        √ 
Table 1. Comparison of some existing buyer-seller watermarking protocols with our 
protocol 
 
As a consequence, it is possible for a malicious seller to frame an innocent buyer, or for an 
accused buyer to repudiate the guilt. This customer's rights problem in symmetric schemes 
was first pointed out (Qiao & Nahrstedt, 1998), and the problem can be solved by asymmetric 
schemes (Pittzmann & Schunter, 1996), (Pfitzmann & Waidner, 1997), (Biehl & Meyer, 1997) 
where only the buyer can obtain the exact watermarked or fingerprinted copy, and hence 
the buyer cannot claim that an pirated copy was originated from the seller. When a pirated 
copy is found, the seller is able to obtain a means to identify and prove the copyright 
violation to a trusted third party. Moreover, in order to provide the buyer's anonymity, 
anonymous schemes (Pfitzmann & Sadeghi, 1999, 2000) further make use of a registration 
service to eliminate the need of exposing the buyer's identity to the seller. 
A buyer-seller watermarking protocol is one that combines encryption, digital watermarking, 
and other techniques to ensure rights protection for both the buyer and the seller in e-
commerce. A complete and sound buyer-seller watermarking protocol is expected to solve 
the following problems. 
1. The piracy tracing problem: once a pirated copy is found, the seller should be able to 
trace and identify the copyright violator. 
2. The customer's rights problem: when a watermark is inserted solely by the seller, the 
seller may benefit from framing attacks to an innocent buyer or it causes unsettled 
disputes. On the other hand, the accused buyer of distributing an unauthorized copy 
may claim that the copy originated from the seller or there existed a security breach in 
the seller's system. 
3. The unbinding problem: upon discovering a pirated copy, the seller can fabricate 
piracy by transplanting the buyer's watermark into another digital content. Therefore, it 
is necessary to bind a chosen watermark with a specific transaction. 
4. The anonymity problem: the identity of a buyer should remain unexposed during 
transactions unless he is proven to be guilty. 
5. The conspiracy problem: malicious parties may collude with each other and mount 
attacks to frame an innocent buyer or to confound the tracing by removing the 
watermark from the digital content. 
6. The dispute problem: the arbitrator should be able to resolve disputes, without the 
buyer revealing his identity or private key. 
Accordingly, a buyer-seller watermarking protocol should provide the following security 
properties as the strategic design principle. 
1. Traceability: a copyright violator should be able to be traced and identified. 
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2. Non-framing: nobody can accuse an honest buyer. 
3. Non-repudiation: a guilty buyer cannot deny his responsibility for a copyright 
violation caused by him. 
4. Dispute resolution: the copyright violator should be identified and adjudicated 
without him revealing his private information, e.g. private keys or watermark. 
5. Conspiracy resistance: no colluded parties should be able to frame an innocent buyer 
or to confound the tracing by removing the watermark from the digital content. 
6. Anonymity: a buyer's identity is undisclosed until he is judged to be guilty. 
7. Unlinkability: nobody can determine whether the different watermarked contents are 
purchased by the same buyer or not. 
 
1.1 Analysis of the Existing Work 
The literature is rich of relevant buyer-seller watermarking protocols. Qiao and Nahrstedt 
(Qiao & Nahrstedt, 1998), first pointed out the customer's rights problem in the watermarking 
protocols for piracy tracing. However, their scheme is symmetric and doesn't guarantee the 
buyer's security. The first known asymmetric buyer-seller watermark protocol was 
introduced by Memon and Wong (Memon & Wong, 2001), and it was improved by Ju et al. 
(Ju et al., 2002). Since the first introduction of the concept, several alternative design solu-
tions have been proposed. Due to the space limit, instead of a full security analysis, we 
summarize the analysis and point out the shortcomings of each previous protocols (Choi et 
al., 2003), (Goi et al., 2004), (Lei et al., 2004), (Zhang et al., 2006), (Shao, 2007), and (Ibrahim 
et al., 2007). Except that the piracy tracing problem and the customer's rights problem are 
solved in the early schemes, the existing solutions to the other problems are either 
impractical or incomplete, as depicted in Table 1. Comparison of some existing buyer-seller 
watermarking protocols with our protocol 
1. The piracy tracing problem. All of these protocols are able to resolve the piracy tracing 
problem, and provide a mechanism for the seller to trace and recover the identity of a 
guilty buyer. 
2. The customer's rights problem. All these protocols can solve the customer's rights 
problem, since the protocols are designed asymmetric, i.e., the seller doesn't know the 
exact value of the buyer's watermark, neither does she know the final watermarked 
digital content that the buyer gets. Therefore, the accused buyer for a illegal replication 
or distribution cannot claim that the copy is originated from the seller or a security 
breach in the seller's system. 
3. The unbinding problem. Lei et al. (Lei et al., 2004) addressed the unbinding problem in 
(Memon & Wong, 2001), (Ju et al., 2002), (Choi et al., 2003), (Goi et al., 2004) and 
provided a mechanism to bind a specific transaction of a digital content to a specific 
buyer, such that a malicious seller cannot transplant the watermark embedded in a 
digital content to another higher-priced content. The similar design principle is applied 
in (Zhang et al., 2006) and (Shao, 2007). 
4. The conspiracy problem. Choi et al. (Choi et al., 2003) pointed out the conspiracy 
problem of (Memon & Wong, 2001), (Ju et al., 2002) where a malicious seller can collude 
with an untrustworthy third party to fabricate piracy to frame an innocent buyer. Goi et 
al. (Goi et al., 2004) found the conspiracy problem couldn't be solved through 
commutative cryptosystems of (Choi et al., 2003), and further point out that the 
schemes of (Memon & Wong, 2001), (Ju et al., 2002), (Choi et al., 2003) are vulnerable 
Problem solved 
 
(Mem
on&
Wong
) 
(Ju 
et al.) 
(Choi 
et al.) 
(Goi 
et al.) 
(Lei 
et al.) 
(Zha
ng et 
al.) 
(Shao
) 
(Ibrah
im et 
al.) 
Ours 
Piracy tracing √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Customer's rights √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Unbinding     √ √ √ √ √ 
Conspiracy    √  √   √ 
Dispute resolution  √   √  √ √ √ 
Anonymity/unlink
ability 
        √ 
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As a consequence, it is possible for a malicious seller to frame an innocent buyer, or for an 
accused buyer to repudiate the guilt. This customer's rights problem in symmetric schemes 
was first pointed out (Qiao & Nahrstedt, 1998), and the problem can be solved by asymmetric 
schemes (Pittzmann & Schunter, 1996), (Pfitzmann & Waidner, 1997), (Biehl & Meyer, 1997) 
where only the buyer can obtain the exact watermarked or fingerprinted copy, and hence 
the buyer cannot claim that an pirated copy was originated from the seller. When a pirated 
copy is found, the seller is able to obtain a means to identify and prove the copyright 
violation to a trusted third party. Moreover, in order to provide the buyer's anonymity, 
anonymous schemes (Pfitzmann & Sadeghi, 1999, 2000) further make use of a registration 
service to eliminate the need of exposing the buyer's identity to the seller. 
A buyer-seller watermarking protocol is one that combines encryption, digital watermarking, 
and other techniques to ensure rights protection for both the buyer and the seller in e-
commerce. A complete and sound buyer-seller watermarking protocol is expected to solve 
the following problems. 
1. The piracy tracing problem: once a pirated copy is found, the seller should be able to 
trace and identify the copyright violator. 
2. The customer's rights problem: when a watermark is inserted solely by the seller, the 
seller may benefit from framing attacks to an innocent buyer or it causes unsettled 
disputes. On the other hand, the accused buyer of distributing an unauthorized copy 
may claim that the copy originated from the seller or there existed a security breach in 
the seller's system. 
3. The unbinding problem: upon discovering a pirated copy, the seller can fabricate 
piracy by transplanting the buyer's watermark into another digital content. Therefore, it 
is necessary to bind a chosen watermark with a specific transaction. 
4. The anonymity problem: the identity of a buyer should remain unexposed during 
transactions unless he is proven to be guilty. 
5. The conspiracy problem: malicious parties may collude with each other and mount 
attacks to frame an innocent buyer or to confound the tracing by removing the 
watermark from the digital content. 
6. The dispute problem: the arbitrator should be able to resolve disputes, without the 
buyer revealing his identity or private key. 
Accordingly, a buyer-seller watermarking protocol should provide the following security 
properties as the strategic design principle. 
1. Traceability: a copyright violator should be able to be traced and identified. 
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able to work properly as designed to be. Next, we point out that the buyer's anonymity or 
the transaction unlinkability is not provided by these two protocols. Second, we propose an 
anonymous buyer-seller watermarking protocol, which is secure and fair for both the seller 
and the buyer. Our protocol employs privacy homomorphic cryptosystems to protect the 
buyer's secret watermark, and group signature schemes to provide revocable anonymity of 
the buyer. The proposed protocol is an improvement of the early work (Deng & Preneel, 
2008), (Zhang et al., 2006). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The security of the protocol by Lei et al. is 
analyzed in Sec. 0. The security of the protocol by Ibrahim et al. is analyzed in Sec. 0. Some 
cryptographic primitives are reviewed in Sec. 0. A generalized model of anonymous buyer-
seller watermarking protocol is defined in Sec. 0. The proposed protocol is explained in Sec. 
0. Finally, the security analysis is provided in Sec. 0 and the conclusion is drawn in Sec. 0. 
 
2. Attacks on the Protocol of Lei et al. 
In the protocol of (Lei et al., 2004), the players are the seller Alice A, the buyer Bob B, the 
certificate authority CA, the watermark certificate authority WCA, and the arbitrator J. The 
protocol comprises three phases, namely the registration protocol, the watermark generation 
and insertion protocol, and the identification and arbitration protocol. We provide an 
overview of the protocol in Fig. 1, Fig. 2, and Fig. 3. Notations are explained in Table 2. 
Notations and abbreviations 
 
2.1 Attack on the Buyer's Security 
Collusion of the seller and the WCA. In the protocol, Alice generates her watermark V and 
embeds V  to the original content X , ´X X V  . The WCA generates Bob's watermark W , 
and sends Alice the two encrypted values of W  with Bob's encryption key *Bpk  and WCA’s 
encryption key WCApk , respectively. Alice embeds the encrypted watermarked, 
* * *( ´´) ( ´) ( )B B Bpk pk pkE X E X E W  . When malicious Alice colludes with an untrustworthy WCA, 
Alice sends * ( )BpkE W  back to the WCA. The WCA recovers W  via decryption, and sends W  
to Alice. After Alice obtains W , she knows all the necessary information X , V , W  to 
reproduce the watermarked content ´´X  for Bob. 
Lei et al. assume that the WCA will not reveal Bob's information to Alice. However, the 
assumption is unrealistic. Because there is no technical enforcement for the WCA not to 
reveal any private information to Alice, the conspiracy attack is effective. Once Alice gets 
Bob's watermark, any important features of the protocol would end up getting 
compromised. First, the piracy traceability won't be achieved, since both the buyer and the 
seller might be the traitor. Second, non-framing fails, even though the unbinding problem is 
solved in the protocol. Alice is able to frame an innocent Bob by reproducing and 
redistributing the watermarked content ´´X . Third, non-repudiation fails, even though B 
doesn't know W  and cannot remove W  from ´´X . A malicious Bob can deny his guilt by 
claiming that the pirated copy was created by Alice or a security breach in Alice's 
computing system. In fact, this attack weakens the security for both the buyer and the seller. 
against conspiracy attacks, and show that the protocol's security shouldn't rely on any 
third party. Zhang et al. (Zhang et al., 2006) apply the idea of (Goi et al., 2004)and 
ensure that the buyer's watermark is generated by the buyer, instead of a watermark 
certificate authority (WCA). According to our analysis, we conclude that the protocols 
of (Lei et al., 2004), (Shao, 2007), and (Ibrahim et al., 2007) cannot resist the conspiracy 
attack, where a malicious seller can collude with a third party, such that the seller can 
discover the buyer's watermark. 
5. The anonymity problem. Memon and Wong’s protocol (Memon & Wong, 2001) 
requires the seller to know the buyer's identity to carry out a transaction. Protocols of 
(Ju et al., 2002), (Choi et al., 2003) improve (Memon & Wong, 2001) by applying an 
anonymous key pair in each transaction. However, both protocols require the WCA to 
know the buyer's identity, which means that the buyer's anonymity is not preserved 
against conspiracy attacks. In (Goi et al., 2004), the buyer is required to request a 
signature from the certification authority (CA) of the public key infrastructure (PKI) to 
generate a watermark. However, (Goi et al., 2004) cannot solve the anonymity problem 
efficiently, since before each transaction, the buyer has to contact the CA for a new 
signature. (Lei et al., 2004), (Zhang et al., 2006), (Shao, 2007) apply anonymous 
certificates, i.e., digital certificates without real identities of applicants. Unfortunately, 
transaction unlinkability is not provided: during all transactions, the anonymous 
certificate stays the same, unless the buyer contacts the CA before each transaction for a 
new certificate, which is impractical for real life applications. 
6. The dispute problem. Zhang et al. (Zhang et al., 2006) presented a scheme, derived 
from (Lei et al., 2004), where no trusted third party (TTP) is required in the watermark 
generation phase and the conspiracy problem is solved. Unfortunately, we find the 
existence of dispute resolution problem in (Zhang et al., 2006), in order to resolve disputes 
the buyer is required to cooperate and reveal his secret key or his secret watermark to 
the judge or to the CA, which is unrealistic in real-life applications. Similarly, schemes 
of (Memon & Wong, 2001), (Choi et al., 2003), (Goi et al., 2004) all require the accused 
but possible innocent buyer to disclose his identity or private key. Moreover, these 
protocols don't operate properly if the underlying cryptosystem is probabilistic, 
because the data encrypted by the judge or the CA may not be equal to the data 
provided by the seller. In (Ju et al., 2002), the buyer creates a key escrow cipher to es-
crow his anonymous private key at the judge. The problem is that the buyer's secrecy 
would not be protected against conspiracy attacks if the judge was malicious. In (Lei et 
al., 2004), the judge requests the buyer's watermark from the WCA, and hence the 
security depends on the trustworthiness of the WCA. 
 
1.2 Our Approach 
From the above analysis, we show that none of the existing protocols fulfils the design 
requirements. Our contribution of this paper is twofold: first, we analyze the security and 
present attacks on the protocols by Lei et al. (Lei et al., 2004), and Ibrahim et al. (Ibrahim et 
al., 2007), and prove that neither of them is able to provide security for the buyer and/or the 
seller as claimed. Further, both protocols require to employ deterministic cryptosystems. 
Unfortunately, all efficient privacy homomorphic cryptosystems are probabilistic (Fontaine 
& Galand, 2007), and both protocols require a privacy homomorphism for watermark 
insertion in the encrypted domain. In this regard, we can prove that both protocols are not 
www.intechopen.com
Attacks on Two Buyer-Seller Watermarking  
Protocols and an Improvement for Revocable Anonymity 187
able to work properly as designed to be. Next, we point out that the buyer's anonymity or 
the transaction unlinkability is not provided by these two protocols. Second, we propose an 
anonymous buyer-seller watermarking protocol, which is secure and fair for both the seller 
and the buyer. Our protocol employs privacy homomorphic cryptosystems to protect the 
buyer's secret watermark, and group signature schemes to provide revocable anonymity of 
the buyer. The proposed protocol is an improvement of the early work (Deng & Preneel, 
2008), (Zhang et al., 2006). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The security of the protocol by Lei et al. is 
analyzed in Sec. 0. The security of the protocol by Ibrahim et al. is analyzed in Sec. 0. Some 
cryptographic primitives are reviewed in Sec. 0. A generalized model of anonymous buyer-
seller watermarking protocol is defined in Sec. 0. The proposed protocol is explained in Sec. 
0. Finally, the security analysis is provided in Sec. 0 and the conclusion is drawn in Sec. 0. 
 
2. Attacks on the Protocol of Lei et al. 
In the protocol of (Lei et al., 2004), the players are the seller Alice A, the buyer Bob B, the 
certificate authority CA, the watermark certificate authority WCA, and the arbitrator J. The 
protocol comprises three phases, namely the registration protocol, the watermark generation 
and insertion protocol, and the identification and arbitration protocol. We provide an 
overview of the protocol in Fig. 1, Fig. 2, and Fig. 3. Notations are explained in Table 2. 
Notations and abbreviations 
 
2.1 Attack on the Buyer's Security 
Collusion of the seller and the WCA. In the protocol, Alice generates her watermark V and 
embeds V  to the original content X , ´X X V  . The WCA generates Bob's watermark W , 
and sends Alice the two encrypted values of W  with Bob's encryption key *Bpk  and WCA’s 
encryption key WCApk , respectively. Alice embeds the encrypted watermarked, 
* * *( ´´) ( ´) ( )B B Bpk pk pkE X E X E W  . When malicious Alice colludes with an untrustworthy WCA, 
Alice sends * ( )BpkE W  back to the WCA. The WCA recovers W  via decryption, and sends W  
to Alice. After Alice obtains W , she knows all the necessary information X , V , W  to 
reproduce the watermarked content ´´X  for Bob. 
Lei et al. assume that the WCA will not reveal Bob's information to Alice. However, the 
assumption is unrealistic. Because there is no technical enforcement for the WCA not to 
reveal any private information to Alice, the conspiracy attack is effective. Once Alice gets 
Bob's watermark, any important features of the protocol would end up getting 
compromised. First, the piracy traceability won't be achieved, since both the buyer and the 
seller might be the traitor. Second, non-framing fails, even though the unbinding problem is 
solved in the protocol. Alice is able to frame an innocent Bob by reproducing and 
redistributing the watermarked content ´´X . Third, non-repudiation fails, even though B 
doesn't know W  and cannot remove W  from ´´X . A malicious Bob can deny his guilt by 
claiming that the pirated copy was created by Alice or a security breach in Alice's 
computing system. In fact, this attack weakens the security for both the buyer and the seller. 
against conspiracy attacks, and show that the protocol's security shouldn't rely on any 
third party. Zhang et al. (Zhang et al., 2006) apply the idea of (Goi et al., 2004)and 
ensure that the buyer's watermark is generated by the buyer, instead of a watermark 
certificate authority (WCA). According to our analysis, we conclude that the protocols 
of (Lei et al., 2004), (Shao, 2007), and (Ibrahim et al., 2007) cannot resist the conspiracy 
attack, where a malicious seller can collude with a third party, such that the seller can 
discover the buyer's watermark. 
5. The anonymity problem. Memon and Wong’s protocol (Memon & Wong, 2001) 
requires the seller to know the buyer's identity to carry out a transaction. Protocols of 
(Ju et al., 2002), (Choi et al., 2003) improve (Memon & Wong, 2001) by applying an 
anonymous key pair in each transaction. However, both protocols require the WCA to 
know the buyer's identity, which means that the buyer's anonymity is not preserved 
against conspiracy attacks. In (Goi et al., 2004), the buyer is required to request a 
signature from the certification authority (CA) of the public key infrastructure (PKI) to 
generate a watermark. However, (Goi et al., 2004) cannot solve the anonymity problem 
efficiently, since before each transaction, the buyer has to contact the CA for a new 
signature. (Lei et al., 2004), (Zhang et al., 2006), (Shao, 2007) apply anonymous 
certificates, i.e., digital certificates without real identities of applicants. Unfortunately, 
transaction unlinkability is not provided: during all transactions, the anonymous 
certificate stays the same, unless the buyer contacts the CA before each transaction for a 
new certificate, which is impractical for real life applications. 
6. The dispute problem. Zhang et al. (Zhang et al., 2006) presented a scheme, derived 
from (Lei et al., 2004), where no trusted third party (TTP) is required in the watermark 
generation phase and the conspiracy problem is solved. Unfortunately, we find the 
existence of dispute resolution problem in (Zhang et al., 2006), in order to resolve disputes 
the buyer is required to cooperate and reveal his secret key or his secret watermark to 
the judge or to the CA, which is unrealistic in real-life applications. Similarly, schemes 
of (Memon & Wong, 2001), (Choi et al., 2003), (Goi et al., 2004) all require the accused 
but possible innocent buyer to disclose his identity or private key. Moreover, these 
protocols don't operate properly if the underlying cryptosystem is probabilistic, 
because the data encrypted by the judge or the CA may not be equal to the data 
provided by the seller. In (Ju et al., 2002), the buyer creates a key escrow cipher to es-
crow his anonymous private key at the judge. The problem is that the buyer's secrecy 
would not be protected against conspiracy attacks if the judge was malicious. In (Lei et 
al., 2004), the judge requests the buyer's watermark from the WCA, and hence the 
security depends on the trustworthiness of the WCA. 
 
1.2 Our Approach 
From the above analysis, we show that none of the existing protocols fulfils the design 
requirements. Our contribution of this paper is twofold: first, we analyze the security and 
present attacks on the protocols by Lei et al. (Lei et al., 2004), and Ibrahim et al. (Ibrahim et 
al., 2007), and prove that neither of them is able to provide security for the buyer and/or the 
seller as claimed. Further, both protocols require to employ deterministic cryptosystems. 
Unfortunately, all efficient privacy homomorphic cryptosystems are probabilistic (Fontaine 
& Galand, 2007), and both protocols require a privacy homomorphism for watermark 
insertion in the encrypted domain. In this regard, we can prove that both protocols are not 
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the same as * ´( )BpkE W , then J rejects the case and the protocol halts. It is obvious that this 
verification won't work using probabilistic cryptosystems. As explained in Sec. The buyer-
seller watermarking protocol requires watermarking insertion to be performed in the 
encrypted domain, and it should be achieved by employing privacy homomorphic 
cryptosystems. However, all efficient privacy homomorphic cryptosystems are probabilistic 
(Fontaine & Galand, 2007). As a result, the protocol fails to function properly as claimed. 
 
2.4 Failure for Unlinkability 
 Fig. 2. The watermark generation and insertion protocol in Lei et al.'s protocol (Lei et al., 
2004). 
 Fig. 3. The identification and arbitration protocol in Lei et al.'s protocol (Lei et al., 2004). 
 
In the protocol, Bob first obtains an anonymous certificate ( )CA BCert pk  from the CA, i.e., a 
digital certificate without the real identity of the applicant, in order to provide the buyer's 
anonymity. As Lei et al. claimed, by issuing the anonymous certificate to Bob, the CA is 
responsible for binding this anonymous certificate to Bob's identity. In each transaction with 
Alice, Bob generates an one-time key pair * *( , )B Bpk sk , and creates a certificate of *Bpk  on the 
honour of the certified public key Bpk . Unfortunately, the protocol fails to provide 
transaction unlinkability: during all transactions from the seller to the buyer, the public key 
anonymous certificate ( )CA BCert pk  stays the same, unless the buyer contacts the CA before 
each transaction to acquire a new certificate, which is impractical for real-life applications. 
 Table 2. Notations and abbreviations 
 
 Fig. 1. The registration protocol in Lei et al.'s protocol (Lei et al., 2004). 
 
2.2 Attack on the Seller's Security 
Collusion of the buyer and the WCA. Besides the conspiracy attack explained above, a 
malicious buyer and the untrustworthy WCA can also collude. In this case, the WCA informs 
Bob the actual value of W  directly, so that it is possible for Bob to remove his watermark 
from the watermarked digital content. Therefore, non-repudiation won't hold, and the 
protocol fails to provide security for the seller. 
 
2.3 Failure for Probabilistic Cryptosystems 
In the arbitration and identification protocol, the WCA is required by the arbitrator J to 
decrypt ( )WCApkE W  and obtain the Bob's watermark W . Then J performs a validation on the 
correctness of the value ( )WCApkE W  sent by Alice, by computing the encryption of W  
obtained from the WCA with the buyer's public key *Bpk  as ( )WCApkE W . If * ( )BpkE W  is not 
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the same as * ´( )BpkE W , then J rejects the case and the protocol halts. It is obvious that this 
verification won't work using probabilistic cryptosystems. As explained in Sec. The buyer-
seller watermarking protocol requires watermarking insertion to be performed in the 
encrypted domain, and it should be achieved by employing privacy homomorphic 
cryptosystems. However, all efficient privacy homomorphic cryptosystems are probabilistic 
(Fontaine & Galand, 2007). As a result, the protocol fails to function properly as claimed. 
 
2.4 Failure for Unlinkability 
 Fig. 2. The watermark generation and insertion protocol in Lei et al.'s protocol (Lei et al., 
2004). 
 Fig. 3. The identification and arbitration protocol in Lei et al.'s protocol (Lei et al., 2004). 
 
In the protocol, Bob first obtains an anonymous certificate ( )CA BCert pk  from the CA, i.e., a 
digital certificate without the real identity of the applicant, in order to provide the buyer's 
anonymity. As Lei et al. claimed, by issuing the anonymous certificate to Bob, the CA is 
responsible for binding this anonymous certificate to Bob's identity. In each transaction with 
Alice, Bob generates an one-time key pair * *( , )B Bpk sk , and creates a certificate of *Bpk  on the 
honour of the certified public key Bpk . Unfortunately, the protocol fails to provide 
transaction unlinkability: during all transactions from the seller to the buyer, the public key 
anonymous certificate ( )CA BCert pk  stays the same, unless the buyer contacts the CA before 
each transaction to acquire a new certificate, which is impractical for real-life applications. 
 Table 2. Notations and abbreviations 
 
 Fig. 1. The registration protocol in Lei et al.'s protocol (Lei et al., 2004). 
 
2.2 Attack on the Seller's Security 
Collusion of the buyer and the WCA. Besides the conspiracy attack explained above, a 
malicious buyer and the untrustworthy WCA can also collude. In this case, the WCA informs 
Bob the actual value of W  directly, so that it is possible for Bob to remove his watermark 
from the watermarked digital content. Therefore, non-repudiation won't hold, and the 
protocol fails to provide security for the seller. 
 
2.3 Failure for Probabilistic Cryptosystems 
In the arbitration and identification protocol, the WCA is required by the arbitrator J to 
decrypt ( )WCApkE W  and obtain the Bob's watermark W . Then J performs a validation on the 
correctness of the value ( )WCApkE W  sent by Alice, by computing the encryption of W  
obtained from the WCA with the buyer's public key *Bpk  as ( )WCApkE W . If * ( )BpkE W  is not 
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protocol halts. Therefore, the protocol fails with probabilistic cryptosystems, because 
´( )BPKE W  computed by the CA and ( )BPKE W  provided by Bob would be different. Then 
Alice would consider the protocol failed, and halt the protocol. Following the same reason-
ing of the similar attack on the Lei et al.'s protocol, we can prove that the protocol fails to 
employ privacy homomorphic probabilistic cryptosystems. 
 
3.3 Failure for Anonymity and Unlinkability 
The protocol doesn't specify the registration subprotocol. In each transaction with Alice, Bob 
provides Alice his PKI certificate ( )CACert B  issued by a trustworthy CA. Since ( )CACert B  is 
not an anonymous certificate, Alice can identify Bob. Therefore, Bob's anonymity is not 
preserved whatsoever. It is clear that the protocol fails to provide anonymity and 
unlinkability for the buyer. 
 
4. Cryptographic Primitives 
4.1 Privacy Homomorphism  
A privacy homomorphism refers to a cryptosystem E which is homomorphic with respect to 
some binary operators M  in the plaintext space M and C  in the ciphertext space C, such 
that  
1 2 1 2 1 2, : ( ) ( ) ( )M Cm m M E m m E m E m     
Homomorphic cryptosystems can be classified as two groups, namely those security relies 
on the “decisional composite residuosity assumption” (DCRA), and those of the ElGamal class 
based on “decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption” (DDH). The strongest security level a privacy 
homomorphism can reach is IND-CPA, instead of IND-CCA2. The state of the art of privacy 
homomorphic cryptosystems is presented in (Fontaine & Galand, 2007). For instance, the 
deterministic RSA cryptosystem (Rivest et al., 1978) and the ElGamal cryptosystem (ElGamal, 
1985) are multiplicative privacy homomorphism. In contrast to deterministic RSA, ElGamal 
is IND-CPA. The Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem (Goldwasser & Micali, 1982), the Paillier 
cryptosystem (Paillier, 1999), and Paillier’s generalization the Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem 
(Damgåard & Jurik, 2001) are additive privacy homomorphism. 
 
4.2 Group Signature 
Group signatures (Chaum & van Heyst, 1991), (Camenisch & Stadler, 1997) enable group 
members, each with its own private signature key to produce signatures on behalf of the 
group. Group signature schemes can either be for static groups, where the identities of 
group members are fixed in the group setup phase; or for dynamic groups, which allow to 
update group members with time. Dynamic schemes have the advantage that instead of 
assigning a high level of trust to a single group manager, the group manager is separated as 
an issuer, to issue private signature keys to the group members, and an opener, to open 
signatures. This provides more security with a lower level of trust. The security properties 
of static and dynamic group signature schemes are formalized in (Bellare et al., 2003, 2005) 
as follows: 
3. Attacks on the Protocol of Ibrahim et al. 
The players involved in the protocol (Ibrahim et al., 2007), are the seller A,  the buyer B, the 
certificate authority CA, and the arbitrator J. The protocol comprises two phases, namely the 
watermark generation and insertion protocol and the identification and arbitration protocol. 
The watermark generation and insertion protocol is reviewed in Fig. 4. 
Fig. 4. The watermark generation and insertion protocol in Ibrahim et al.'s protocol (Ibrahim 
et al., 2007). 
 
3.1 Attack on the Seller's Security 
In the protocol, Bob generates his secret watermark W , and W  is approved by the CA. The 
watermarked content is ´´X X V W   , V  is Alice's watermark. Since Bob knows W , it 
is possible for Bob to remove his watermark W  from the watermarked content ´´X . Hence, 
the protocol fails to provide non-repudiation and traitor traceability. 
Ibrahim et al. assume that it is impossible for Bob to remove W  from ´´X , because Bob 
doesn't have access of the original content X  nor the watermark embedding algorithm. 
Unfortunately, the assumption is unrealistic, and it can be combated by employing a blind 
watermarking scheme (Kutter & Petitcolas, 1999), (Eggers et al., 2000), where the original 
content is not required to remove the watermark. On the other hand, there is no technical 
enforcement to ensure that Bob can't get the knowledge of the watermarking algorithm em-
ployed in the protocol. In fact, according to Kerckhoffs' principle in cryptography, “a 
cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public 
knowledge.” “The system must not require secrecy and can be stolen by the enemy without 
causing trouble” (Kerckhoffs, 1883). Therefore, the attack is effective and non-repudiation 
fails. The protocol fails to provide both the basic requirement of traitor traceability and the 
seller's security. 
 
3.2 Failure for Probabilistic Cryptosystems 
In the watermark generation and insertion protocol, after Alice receives the encrypted value 
( ´( ))CA BSK PKE E W  from the CA, Alice decrypts ( ´( ))CA BSK PKE E W  using the CA's public key 
CApk , and then computes the message digest of the result ´( )BPKE W , as ´( ´( ))BPKH E W . Next, 
Alice computes the message digest of ( )BPKE W  sent earlier by Bob, as ( ( ))BPKH E W . Alice 
compares ´( ´( ))BPKH E W  and ( ( ))BPKH E W . The protocol continues if they equal, else the 
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protocol halts. Therefore, the protocol fails with probabilistic cryptosystems, because 
´( )BPKE W  computed by the CA and ( )BPKE W  provided by Bob would be different. Then 
Alice would consider the protocol failed, and halt the protocol. Following the same reason-
ing of the similar attack on the Lei et al.'s protocol, we can prove that the protocol fails to 
employ privacy homomorphic probabilistic cryptosystems. 
 
3.3 Failure for Anonymity and Unlinkability 
The protocol doesn't specify the registration subprotocol. In each transaction with Alice, Bob 
provides Alice his PKI certificate ( )CACert B  issued by a trustworthy CA. Since ( )CACert B  is 
not an anonymous certificate, Alice can identify Bob. Therefore, Bob's anonymity is not 
preserved whatsoever. It is clear that the protocol fails to provide anonymity and 
unlinkability for the buyer. 
 
4. Cryptographic Primitives 
4.1 Privacy Homomorphism  
A privacy homomorphism refers to a cryptosystem E which is homomorphic with respect to 
some binary operators M  in the plaintext space M and C  in the ciphertext space C, such 
that  
1 2 1 2 1 2, : ( ) ( ) ( )M Cm m M E m m E m E m     
Homomorphic cryptosystems can be classified as two groups, namely those security relies 
on the “decisional composite residuosity assumption” (DCRA), and those of the ElGamal class 
based on “decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption” (DDH). The strongest security level a privacy 
homomorphism can reach is IND-CPA, instead of IND-CCA2. The state of the art of privacy 
homomorphic cryptosystems is presented in (Fontaine & Galand, 2007). For instance, the 
deterministic RSA cryptosystem (Rivest et al., 1978) and the ElGamal cryptosystem (ElGamal, 
1985) are multiplicative privacy homomorphism. In contrast to deterministic RSA, ElGamal 
is IND-CPA. The Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem (Goldwasser & Micali, 1982), the Paillier 
cryptosystem (Paillier, 1999), and Paillier’s generalization the Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem 
(Damgåard & Jurik, 2001) are additive privacy homomorphism. 
 
4.2 Group Signature 
Group signatures (Chaum & van Heyst, 1991), (Camenisch & Stadler, 1997) enable group 
members, each with its own private signature key to produce signatures on behalf of the 
group. Group signature schemes can either be for static groups, where the identities of 
group members are fixed in the group setup phase; or for dynamic groups, which allow to 
update group members with time. Dynamic schemes have the advantage that instead of 
assigning a high level of trust to a single group manager, the group manager is separated as 
an issuer, to issue private signature keys to the group members, and an opener, to open 
signatures. This provides more security with a lower level of trust. The security properties 
of static and dynamic group signature schemes are formalized in (Bellare et al., 2003, 2005) 
as follows: 
3. Attacks on the Protocol of Ibrahim et al. 
The players involved in the protocol (Ibrahim et al., 2007), are the seller A,  the buyer B, the 
certificate authority CA, and the arbitrator J. The protocol comprises two phases, namely the 
watermark generation and insertion protocol and the identification and arbitration protocol. 
The watermark generation and insertion protocol is reviewed in Fig. 4. 
Fig. 4. The watermark generation and insertion protocol in Ibrahim et al.'s protocol (Ibrahim 
et al., 2007). 
 
3.1 Attack on the Seller's Security 
In the protocol, Bob generates his secret watermark W , and W  is approved by the CA. The 
watermarked content is ´´X X V W   , V  is Alice's watermark. Since Bob knows W , it 
is possible for Bob to remove his watermark W  from the watermarked content ´´X . Hence, 
the protocol fails to provide non-repudiation and traitor traceability. 
Ibrahim et al. assume that it is impossible for Bob to remove W  from ´´X , because Bob 
doesn't have access of the original content X  nor the watermark embedding algorithm. 
Unfortunately, the assumption is unrealistic, and it can be combated by employing a blind 
watermarking scheme (Kutter & Petitcolas, 1999), (Eggers et al., 2000), where the original 
content is not required to remove the watermark. On the other hand, there is no technical 
enforcement to ensure that Bob can't get the knowledge of the watermarking algorithm em-
ployed in the protocol. In fact, according to Kerckhoffs' principle in cryptography, “a 
cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public 
knowledge.” “The system must not require secrecy and can be stolen by the enemy without 
causing trouble” (Kerckhoffs, 1883). Therefore, the attack is effective and non-repudiation 
fails. The protocol fails to provide both the basic requirement of traitor traceability and the 
seller's security. 
 
3.2 Failure for Probabilistic Cryptosystems 
In the watermark generation and insertion protocol, after Alice receives the encrypted value 
( ´( ))CA BSK PKE E W  from the CA, Alice decrypts ( ´( ))CA BSK PKE E W  using the CA's public key 
CApk , and then computes the message digest of the result ´( )BPKE W , as ´( ´( ))BPKH E W . Next, 
Alice computes the message digest of ( )BPKE W  sent earlier by Bob, as ( ( ))BPKH E W . Alice 
compares ´( ´( ))BPKH E W  and ( ( ))BPKH E W . The protocol continues if they equal, else the 
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3. Arb: a three-party protocol (Arb-A, Arb-J, Arb-CA) among A, J, and the CA. A and J 's 
input are a pirated copy Y , the cover data 0X , and a record in ATable . The 
CA's input are ),,( ikokgpk  and the list of buyer’s certificates in the registration table
reg . The CA's output is the identity id  of a guilty buyer with a proof  . J verifies   
and provides A the output as id  or an empty string   in case of failure. 
Note that the registration protocol Reg is required to be performed once in the setup-phase 
by the CA for each new buyer. The watermarking protocol WK should be executed multiple 
times for multiple transactions between the buyer and the seller. The arbitration protocol 
Arb is executed for dispute resolution. 
 
6. Proposed Protocol 
The proposed buyer-seller watermarking protocol involves four players: the seller Alice, the 
buyer Bob, the trustworthy CA that functions as a group manager, and an arbitrator. The 
protocol consists of three phases. First, Bob registers at the CA before the purchase in the 
registration protocol. Second, Bob only needs to contact Alice during transactions in the 
watermark generation and insertion protocol. Third, in case Alice found a pirated copy, the 
identification and arbitration protocol enables her to identify the copyright violator, with the 
help of the judge and the CA. 
The following assumptions should hold in the protocol, otherwise, the security properties 
cannot be guaranteed. We assume a public key infrastructure PKI is well deployed, such 
that each entity has a PKI certificate issued by the CA. The CA is assumed to be trustworthy, 
because the PKI should be secure. For consistency, we assume that the digital content is a 
still image, although the protocol can be applied to other multimedia formats such as audio 
or video. Note that the security of the protocol depends on the security of the underlying 
watermarking and cryptographic building blocks. Hence, the watermarking scheme 
employed should be collusion resistant. In particular, nobody is able to detect and delete the 
embedded watermark from a content without knowing the watermark. Our scheme 
employs the privacy homomorphism of the Paillier cryptosystem (Paillier, 1999) and Cox et 
al.'s robust collusion resistant watermarking scheme (Cox et al., 1997). Camenisch et al.'s 
verifiable encryption scheme (Camenisch & Shoup, 2003) is employed for the key escrow of 
the buyer's private key at the CA, such that the buyer can prove to the seller that the 
plaintext is valid without revealing the secrecy. We choose to employ the dynamic group 
signature proposed by Bellare et al. (Bellare et al., 2005) as an example. 
 
6.1 Registration Protocol 
The registration protocol, performed between the buyer Bob and the CA,  is depicted in Fig. 5. 
1) In the group key generation phase, the CA generates a tuple ( , )gpk gmsk . The group 
public key gpk  consists of a public encryption key epk , a certificate verification key spk
, and some security parameters. The manager secret key gmsk  is the decryption key 
esk  corresponding to epk . The certificate creation key is ssk , corresponding to spk .  
1) Anonymity allows group members to create signatures anonymously, such that it is 
hard for an adversary, not in possession of the group manager's opening key to recover 
the identity of the signer. 
2) Traceability permits the signer's anonymity to be revoked by the group manager in 
case of misuse, and ensures that no colluded group members can create unverifiable 
signatures, or signatures that can't be traced back to some member of the coalition. 
3) Non-frameability requires that no adversary can produce a signature in the name of a 
user unless the latter indeed produced it. 
 
4.3 Verifiable Encryption 
Verifiable encryption schemes enable the encrypter to ensure that the plaintext satisfies 
certain application-dependent properties without compromising secrecy. It can be employed 
in numerous applications including escrow schemes (Young & Yung, 1998), (Poupard & 
Stern, 2000), group signature and identity escrow schemes (Ateniese et al., 2000), (Kilian & 
Petrank, 1998), and digital payment with revocable anonymity (Frankel et al., 1996), 
(Camenisch et al., 1996). Specific schemes are proposed in (Camenisch & Shoup, 2003) for 
both discrete-log based and factoring based schemes. In our proposed scheme, verifiable 
encryption is used for key escrow, such that the buyer can prove to the seller that the 
plaintext is valid without revealing any private information, and hence the buyer's privacy 
is preserved. 
 
5. Model of Anonymous Buyer-Seller Watermarking Protocols 
Let *0 {0,1}X   be the cover data,   be the set of all watermarked copies of 0X , and k  be a 
security parameter as a common input for all algorithms. An anonymous buyer-seller 
watermarking protocol involves four parties: a seller Alice A that is the copyright holder, a 
buyer Bob B, a certificate authority CA that functions as a group manager, and a judge J that 
adjudicates lawsuits against the infringement of copyrights. The protocol consists of the 
following three subprotocols. 
1. Reg: the registration protocol consists of an algorithm Set-CA and a protocol Reg-CAB. 
Set-CA is a probabilistic key setup algorithm to generate group manager's public key 
gpk  and private keys ),( ikok  of the CA. Reg-CAB is a probabilistic two-party 
protocol (Reg-CA, Reg-B) between the CA and the buyer B. Their common input are B's 
identity B and gpk . The CA's secret input is ),( ikok . B's output is his private group 
signature key Bgsk . The CA stores B's group certificate BCert  and the buyer's 
identity B in a registration table as  Breg . 
2. WK: a two-party protocol (WK-A,WK-B) between the seller A and the buyer B. Their 
common input is gpk . A's secret input are the cover data 0X  and a transaction 
number  , and A's output is a transaction record in ATable . B's secret input is B's 
group signature key Bgsk , and B's output is a watermarked copy ´X . 
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3. Arb: a three-party protocol (Arb-A, Arb-J, Arb-CA) among A, J, and the CA. A and J 's 
input are a pirated copy Y , the cover data 0X , and a record in ATable . The 
CA's input are ),,( ikokgpk  and the list of buyer’s certificates in the registration table
reg . The CA's output is the identity id  of a guilty buyer with a proof  . J verifies   
and provides A the output as id  or an empty string   in case of failure. 
Note that the registration protocol Reg is required to be performed once in the setup-phase 
by the CA for each new buyer. The watermarking protocol WK should be executed multiple 
times for multiple transactions between the buyer and the seller. The arbitration protocol 
Arb is executed for dispute resolution. 
 
6. Proposed Protocol 
The proposed buyer-seller watermarking protocol involves four players: the seller Alice, the 
buyer Bob, the trustworthy CA that functions as a group manager, and an arbitrator. The 
protocol consists of three phases. First, Bob registers at the CA before the purchase in the 
registration protocol. Second, Bob only needs to contact Alice during transactions in the 
watermark generation and insertion protocol. Third, in case Alice found a pirated copy, the 
identification and arbitration protocol enables her to identify the copyright violator, with the 
help of the judge and the CA. 
The following assumptions should hold in the protocol, otherwise, the security properties 
cannot be guaranteed. We assume a public key infrastructure PKI is well deployed, such 
that each entity has a PKI certificate issued by the CA. The CA is assumed to be trustworthy, 
because the PKI should be secure. For consistency, we assume that the digital content is a 
still image, although the protocol can be applied to other multimedia formats such as audio 
or video. Note that the security of the protocol depends on the security of the underlying 
watermarking and cryptographic building blocks. Hence, the watermarking scheme 
employed should be collusion resistant. In particular, nobody is able to detect and delete the 
embedded watermark from a content without knowing the watermark. Our scheme 
employs the privacy homomorphism of the Paillier cryptosystem (Paillier, 1999) and Cox et 
al.'s robust collusion resistant watermarking scheme (Cox et al., 1997). Camenisch et al.'s 
verifiable encryption scheme (Camenisch & Shoup, 2003) is employed for the key escrow of 
the buyer's private key at the CA, such that the buyer can prove to the seller that the 
plaintext is valid without revealing the secrecy. We choose to employ the dynamic group 
signature proposed by Bellare et al. (Bellare et al., 2005) as an example. 
 
6.1 Registration Protocol 
The registration protocol, performed between the buyer Bob and the CA,  is depicted in Fig. 5. 
1) In the group key generation phase, the CA generates a tuple ( , )gpk gmsk . The group 
public key gpk  consists of a public encryption key epk , a certificate verification key spk
, and some security parameters. The manager secret key gmsk  is the decryption key 
esk  corresponding to epk . The certificate creation key is ssk , corresponding to spk .  
1) Anonymity allows group members to create signatures anonymously, such that it is 
hard for an adversary, not in possession of the group manager's opening key to recover 
the identity of the signer. 
2) Traceability permits the signer's anonymity to be revoked by the group manager in 
case of misuse, and ensures that no colluded group members can create unverifiable 
signatures, or signatures that can't be traced back to some member of the coalition. 
3) Non-frameability requires that no adversary can produce a signature in the name of a 
user unless the latter indeed produced it. 
 
4.3 Verifiable Encryption 
Verifiable encryption schemes enable the encrypter to ensure that the plaintext satisfies 
certain application-dependent properties without compromising secrecy. It can be employed 
in numerous applications including escrow schemes (Young & Yung, 1998), (Poupard & 
Stern, 2000), group signature and identity escrow schemes (Ateniese et al., 2000), (Kilian & 
Petrank, 1998), and digital payment with revocable anonymity (Frankel et al., 1996), 
(Camenisch et al., 1996). Specific schemes are proposed in (Camenisch & Shoup, 2003) for 
both discrete-log based and factoring based schemes. In our proposed scheme, verifiable 
encryption is used for key escrow, such that the buyer can prove to the seller that the 
plaintext is valid without revealing any private information, and hence the buyer's privacy 
is preserved. 
 
5. Model of Anonymous Buyer-Seller Watermarking Protocols 
Let *0 {0,1}X   be the cover data,   be the set of all watermarked copies of 0X , and k  be a 
security parameter as a common input for all algorithms. An anonymous buyer-seller 
watermarking protocol involves four parties: a seller Alice A that is the copyright holder, a 
buyer Bob B, a certificate authority CA that functions as a group manager, and a judge J that 
adjudicates lawsuits against the infringement of copyrights. The protocol consists of the 
following three subprotocols. 
1. Reg: the registration protocol consists of an algorithm Set-CA and a protocol Reg-CAB. 
Set-CA is a probabilistic key setup algorithm to generate group manager's public key 
gpk  and private keys ),( ikok  of the CA. Reg-CAB is a probabilistic two-party 
protocol (Reg-CA, Reg-B) between the CA and the buyer B. Their common input are B's 
identity B and gpk . The CA's secret input is ),( ikok . B's output is his private group 
signature key Bgsk . The CA stores B's group certificate BCert  and the buyer's 
identity B in a registration table as  Breg . 
2. WK: a two-party protocol (WK-A,WK-B) between the seller A and the buyer B. Their 
common input is gpk . A's secret input are the cover data 0X  and a transaction 
number  , and A's output is a transaction record in ATable . B's secret input is B's 
group signature key Bgsk , and B's output is a watermarked copy ´X . 
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2) To join the group, Bob generates a public and private key pair ( , )B Bupk usk , and a 
signing and verifiction key pair ( , )B Bpk sk . Bob sends to the CA his signature Bsig  on 
Bpk with the key Busk . 
3) After the signature is verified, the CA issues the group membership to Bob by issuing a 
certificate of Bpk  and Bob's identity B. Then the CA stores Bob's public key and Bob's 
signature ( , )B Bpk sig  in the registration table reg . 
4) Bob receives the certificate BCert  and derives his group signature key Bgsk  from the 
tuple ,( , , )B B BB pk sk Cert . 
 
6.2 Watermark Generation and Embedding Protocol 
The watermark generation and insertion protocol, as depicted in Fig. 6, can be executed 
multiple times for multiple transactions between the seller Alice and the buyer Bob. In order 
to uniquely bind a particular transaction to the item of interest X , Alice and Bob first nego-
tiate a purchase agreement ARG on transaction specifications. 
1) Bob generates a one-time anonymous public and private key pair ),( ** BB skpk , and 
signs the public key *Bpk  with his group signature key Bgsk . For key escrow, Bob 
encrypts the secret key *Bsk  with the CA's encryption key CApk , and computes a 
verifiable proof *Bskpf  for the escrow cipher esce , in order to assure Alice that the 
encrypted message is valid without compromising *Bsk . For each transaction, Bob 
generates a unique watermark BW , in compliance with the features of the content X  
for robustness, and transfers the encrypted watermark and all the other public 
information m  to Alice. 
2) Alice verifies Bob's signature and verifiable proof, as well as Bob's group signature on 
his anonymous public key. Similarly, Alice generates two unique watermarks V  and 
AW  for each transaction. The first round of watermark insertion is performed as: 
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Note that the sole purpose of V , is to be used as a key to search the sales record in case 
Alice finds a pirated copy of her products (Memon & Wong, 2001), (Lei et al., 2004). 
3) Alice computes the composite watermark W  in the encrypted domain by employing 
privacy homomorphism: 
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2) To join the group, Bob generates a public and private key pair ( , )B Bupk usk , and a 
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encrypts the secret key *Bsk  with the CA's encryption key CApk , and computes a 
verifiable proof *Bskpf  for the escrow cipher esce , in order to assure Alice that the 
encrypted message is valid without compromising *Bsk . For each transaction, Bob 
generates a unique watermark BW , in compliance with the features of the content X  
for robustness, and transfers the encrypted watermark and all the other public 
information m  to Alice. 
2) Alice verifies Bob's signature and verifiable proof, as well as Bob's group signature on 
his anonymous public key. Similarly, Alice generates two unique watermarks V  and 
AW  for each transaction. The first round of watermark insertion is performed as: 
VXX ´                                                                (1) 
Note that the sole purpose of V , is to be used as a key to search the sales record in case 
Alice finds a pirated copy of her products (Memon & Wong, 2001), (Lei et al., 2004). 
3) Alice computes the composite watermark W  in the encrypted domain by employing 
privacy homomorphism: 
)()()()( **** BApkBpkApkpk WWEWEWEWE BBBB   (2) 
4) Alice performs the second round of watermark insertion: 
 Fig. 5. The registration protocol performed between the buyer B and the CA. 
 Fig. 6. The watermark generation and embedding protocol performed between the seller A 
and the buyer B. 
 Fig. 7. The copyright violator identification and arbitration protocol performed among the 
seller A, the judge J, and the CA. 
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1. Non-framing (buyer's security). Alice only knows the encrypted content ´´)(* XE Bpk , 
but she doesn't know the watermarked content delivered to Bob ´´X , neither does she 
know Bob's secret watermark BW . Therefore, Alice cannot accuse Bob by distributing 
replicas of ´´X  herself.  That is, the customer's rights problem is solved. On the other 
hand, Bob is able to generate his watermark and there is no third party involved in the 
watermark generation phase. Therefore, Alice cannot recover Bob's watermark via 
conspiracy attacks. Further, the unbinding problem is solved because Alice can't forge 
Bob's signature that explicitly binds )(* Bpk WE B , *Bpk  to ARG, which in turn binds to 
a particular transaction of X . In this regard, it is infeasible for Alice to transplant Bob's 
watermark to another content to fabricate piracy. 
2. Non repudiation (seller's security). Bob only knows his watermark BW , but not the 
composite watermark W  generated from the watermarks of Alice and Bob. On the 
other hand, there is no third party involved in the protocol, so Bob cannot obtain any 
secret information via conspiracy attacks. Therefore, it is infeasible for Bob to remove 
his watermark BW  from the watermarked content ´´X , neither can he claim that the 
copy was created by Alice or a security breach of Alice's system. Because only Bob 
knows *Bsk  and BW , no one can forge Bob's copy. 
3. Traceability. The protocol provides a mechanism that, once a pirated copy is found, 
Alice can provide the judge with sufficient information related to the particular 
transaction. The judge is able to identify the privacy violator with the help of the CA, 
due to the traceability property of the underlying group signature scheme. 
4. Dispute resolution. When a dispute occurs, even without Bob providing his secret key 
*Bsk  or his secret watermark BW , the judge can still recover *Bsk  from the CA, with 
the help of the key escrow cipher esce  and the proof *Bskpf . Once *Bsk  is recovered, 
the judge knows W  and can further arbitrate if the suspected Bob is guilty or not. 
5. Conspiracy resistance. Bob is able to generate his own wat ermark and there is no third 
party involved in the watermark generation and insertion protocol. It enables the 
scheme to be conspiracy resistant. 
6. Revocable anonymity. The essential protection of the buyer's privacy is by taking 
advantage of the group signature scheme and the one-time anonymous public and 
private key pair. Before the purchase, Bob requests a group signature key Bgsk  from 
the trustworthy CA, which in turn takes responsibility to bind Bob's signature key to 
Bob's identity. In each transaction with Alice, Bob uses an anonymous public and 
private key pair ),( ** BB skpk  and generates a signature   to *Bpk  with the group 
signature key Bgsk . By the anonymity property introduced by the underlying group 
signature scheme (Bellare et al., 2005), it is computationally infeasible for an adversary, 
not in possession of the opener's opening key ok , to recover the identity of the signer 
from its signature. Note that the CA is trustworthy, otherwise the group signature 
)´()(´)(´´)( **** WXEWEXEXE BBBB pkpkpkpk   (3) 
Where   denotes the watermark insertion operation in the message space, and   
denotes the corresponding operation in the encrypted domain. Note that the 
computation is possible because we assume the encryption )(* BpkE  is privacy 
homomorphic with respect to  . Alice stores AW , V , AW  and Bob's information in 
ATable , and delivers the encrypted content ´´X  to Bob. 
5) After decryption ))(( ** WED BB pksk , Bob obtains the watermarked content ´´X  from 
Alice. 
 
6.3 Identification and Arbitration Protocol 
The identification and arbitration protocol is executed among the seller Alice A, an judge 
J, and the CA, as depicted in Fig. 7. 
1) In case Alice finds a pirated copy Y of X , she extracts the watermark U  from Y , 
and searches the sales record by correlating U  with every V  in ATable . Then she 
provides all relevant information together with the intermediate watermarked content 
´X  to J. 
2) If the signature provided by Alice is verified, J accepts the case and forwards the seller's 
key escrow cipher to the CA to recover the private key of the buyer. 
3) The CA decrypts the cipher, recovers the key, and returns the encrypted value 
)( *Bpk skE J  to J. 
4) After J obtains the buyer's key by decryption ))(( *Bpksk skED JJ , he further obtains 
the buyer's secret watermark )(* ewDW Bsk . Then J compares the extracted 
watermark from ´X  and Y  provided by Alice, with the one that is derived from the 
recovered watermarks   ) ,( BA WW  from the buyer and the seller. If they match with a 
high correlation, the suspected buyer is proven to be guilty. Otherwise, the buyer is 
innocent. Note that until now, the buyer's identity is unexposed. 
5) To recover the buyer's identity, J orders the CA to open the buyer's group signature, 
with the group manager's secret key gmsk . 
6) Upon receiving the recovered identity B and a claim proof  , J verifies the CA's claim. 
7) If verified, J closes the case and announces that the buyer with identity B is guilty. 
 
7. Security Analysis 
In this section, we analyze the security properties of the proposed scheme. The soundness 
and completeness of the protocol rely on the security and robustness of the underlying 
cryptographic and watermarking primitives. 
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know Bob's secret watermark BW . Therefore, Alice cannot accuse Bob by distributing 
replicas of ´´X  herself.  That is, the customer's rights problem is solved. On the other 
hand, Bob is able to generate his watermark and there is no third party involved in the 
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Bob's signature that explicitly binds )(* Bpk WE B , *Bpk  to ARG, which in turn binds to 
a particular transaction of X . In this regard, it is infeasible for Alice to transplant Bob's 
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copy was created by Alice or a security breach of Alice's system. Because only Bob 
knows *Bsk  and BW , no one can forge Bob's copy. 
3. Traceability. The protocol provides a mechanism that, once a pirated copy is found, 
Alice can provide the judge with sufficient information related to the particular 
transaction. The judge is able to identify the privacy violator with the help of the CA, 
due to the traceability property of the underlying group signature scheme. 
4. Dispute resolution. When a dispute occurs, even without Bob providing his secret key 
*Bsk  or his secret watermark BW , the judge can still recover *Bsk  from the CA, with 
the help of the key escrow cipher esce  and the proof *Bskpf . Once *Bsk  is recovered, 
the judge knows W  and can further arbitrate if the suspected Bob is guilty or not. 
5. Conspiracy resistance. Bob is able to generate his own wat ermark and there is no third 
party involved in the watermark generation and insertion protocol. It enables the 
scheme to be conspiracy resistant. 
6. Revocable anonymity. The essential protection of the buyer's privacy is by taking 
advantage of the group signature scheme and the one-time anonymous public and 
private key pair. Before the purchase, Bob requests a group signature key Bgsk  from 
the trustworthy CA, which in turn takes responsibility to bind Bob's signature key to 
Bob's identity. In each transaction with Alice, Bob uses an anonymous public and 
private key pair ),( ** BB skpk  and generates a signature   to *Bpk  with the group 
signature key Bgsk . By the anonymity property introduced by the underlying group 
signature scheme (Bellare et al., 2005), it is computationally infeasible for an adversary, 
not in possession of the opener's opening key ok , to recover the identity of the signer 
from its signature. Note that the CA is trustworthy, otherwise the group signature 
)´()(´)(´´)( **** WXEWEXEXE BBBB pkpkpkpk   (3) 
Where   denotes the watermark insertion operation in the message space, and   
denotes the corresponding operation in the encrypted domain. Note that the 
computation is possible because we assume the encryption )(* BpkE  is privacy 
homomorphic with respect to  . Alice stores AW , V , AW  and Bob's information in 
ATable , and delivers the encrypted content ´´X  to Bob. 
5) After decryption ))(( ** WED BB pksk , Bob obtains the watermarked content ´´X  from 
Alice. 
 
6.3 Identification and Arbitration Protocol 
The identification and arbitration protocol is executed among the seller Alice A, an judge 
J, and the CA, as depicted in Fig. 7. 
1) In case Alice finds a pirated copy Y of X , she extracts the watermark U  from Y , 
and searches the sales record by correlating U  with every V  in ATable . Then she 
provides all relevant information together with the intermediate watermarked content 
´X  to J. 
2) If the signature provided by Alice is verified, J accepts the case and forwards the seller's 
key escrow cipher to the CA to recover the private key of the buyer. 
3) The CA decrypts the cipher, recovers the key, and returns the encrypted value 
)( *Bpk skE J  to J. 
4) After J obtains the buyer's key by decryption ))(( *Bpksk skED JJ , he further obtains 
the buyer's secret watermark )(* ewDW Bsk . Then J compares the extracted 
watermark from ´X  and Y  provided by Alice, with the one that is derived from the 
recovered watermarks   ) ,( BA WW  from the buyer and the seller. If they match with a 
high correlation, the suspected buyer is proven to be guilty. Otherwise, the buyer is 
innocent. Note that until now, the buyer's identity is unexposed. 
5) To recover the buyer's identity, J orders the CA to open the buyer's group signature, 
with the group manager's secret key gmsk . 
6) Upon receiving the recovered identity B and a claim proof  , J verifies the CA's claim. 
7) If verified, J closes the case and announces that the buyer with identity B is guilty. 
 
7. Security Analysis 
In this section, we analyze the security properties of the proposed scheme. The soundness 
and completeness of the protocol rely on the security and robustness of the underlying 
cryptographic and watermarking primitives. 
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scheme would not be secure. In case of disputes, Alice collects the transaction 
information and sends  , *Bpk , ARG, Bew , *Bskpf  and esce  to the judge for 
arbitration. The information can only prove someone with an anonymous key *Bpk  
has bought the product X , but it doesn't disclose the identity of Bob. Only when Bob 
is adjudicated to be guilty, the judge can send a legal order for the CA to recover Bob's 
identity. Therefore, Bob's anonymity is not revoked by the CA only until he is 
adjudicated to be guilty. 
7. Unlinkability. Unlinkability is provided in the proposed protocol because of the 
unlinkability property introduced by the underlying group signature and Bob's one-
time key pair ),( ** BB skpk . Given the list of sales information, no one can relate two 
transactions together as if they were from the same buyer. 
8. Mutual authentication. Man-in-the-middle attacks on the protocol are infeasible. First, 
the PKI is well deployed to ensure mutual authentication between entities, as the basic 
requirement of a secure protocol. Second, all messages are transferred in a secure 
communication channel, such that eavesdropping is infeasible. 
 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, we present attacks on two buyer-seller watermarking protocols proposed by 
Lei et al. (Lei et al., 2004) and Ibrahim et al. (Ibrahim et al., 2007), and prove that neither of 
these protocols is able to provide security for the buyer or the seller as claimed. Further, we 
point out that both protocols are not able to work properly when employing homomorphic 
probabilistic cryptosystems. We also address the anonymity and unlinkability problem in 
these protocols. We propose an improved protocol,  which is secure and fair for both the 
seller and the buyer. Our protocol employs privacy homomorphic cryptosystems and group 
signature schemes, in order to protect the secrecy of the buyer and the seller, and to preserve 
revocable anonymity of the buyer. Comparing with early work, our scheme is able to 
provide all the required security properties of a secure and anonymous buyer-seller 
watermarking protocol, namely non-framing, non-repudiation, traceability,  mutual 
authentication, dispute resolution, anonymity and unlinkability. 
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